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Abstract 
 Evidence in financial markets of an opportunity for pure arbitrage, and therefore a 
violation of the law of one price, is considered an anomaly to be noted. This paper reports an 
apparent violation of the law of one price between UK government gilts and their separately 
traded principal and coupon strips over a sample period of nearly 14 years. There are 
persistent price differences, and hence opportunities for arbitrage, after allowance for the bid-
ask spread; the strips package tends to be overpriced in relation to the corresponding gilt. The 
price differences may, in part, be due to a lack of liquidity and stale prices in the strips 
market. 
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Are there arbitrage gaps in the UK gilt strips market? 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the fundamental tenets of the received theory of finance is that arbitrage opportunities 
should not persist, or equivalently, that the law of one price should prevail. In the context of 
financial markets, no-arbitrage in the strong sense means that two assets that are freely traded 
and have exactly the same payoffs should cost the same. This principle is fundamental 
because it assumes a minimum standard of rationality and awareness on the part of market 
participants.  
 
There is a weaker notion of no-arbitrage, implied by the principle of market efficiency, under 
which assets that do not provide the same payoffs should nevertheless be priced in a 
consistent manner.1 The behavioural finance literature points out that individuals often do not, 
in practice, value assets and make decisions in the fully rational manner assumed by classical 
finance theory. The ‘mistakes’ that people make could have the consequence that market 
prices do not always reflect all publicly available information, and that no-arbitrage in the 
weaker sense does not hold.2 However, the psychological traits pointed out in behavioural 
finance, such as overconfidence, or aversion to realising losses, tend to result in mistakes 
which have degrees of subtlety. They involve what might be called errors of judgement.  
 
                                                 
1
 Using the concept of payoffs in future states of the world, no-arbitrage in the weaker sense means 
that the price today of one unit of payoff in a given future state x is the same across all assets with 
state-contingent payoffs that include a payoff in the state x. Of course, if no-arbitrage in the strong 
sense does not hold, no-arbitrage in the weaker sense cannot hold either. See Arrow (1964) or Myers 
(1968). 
2
 See, for example, Shleifer (2000) or Shiller (2003), for reviews. 
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A key point about no-arbitrage in the strong sense is that someone who fails to exploit a pure 
arbitrage opportunity is apparently making a basic error or oversight. The opportunity should 
be obvious, the trades required to exploit it will involve zero or minimal risk, and if short-
selling is possible the trades need involve no change in an arbitrageur’s holdings of securities. 
Examples where no-arbitrage appears to be violated are, therefore, both puzzling and 
potentially helpful in developing our understanding of how financial markets work in practice. 
 
Several papers have presented evidence that pure arbitrage opportunities can persist in 
financial markets, after making careful allowance for transaction costs, taxes, and other 
frictions which might mean that a given arbitrage opportunity is illusory. Grinblatt and 
Longstaff (2000) using US data, and Halpern and Rumsey (2000) using Canadian data, find 
that there are valuation differences between government bonds and the corresponding 
packages of strips which provide exactly equal cash flows. Grinblatt and Longstaff conjecture 
that factors such as liquidity, maturity and taxation might explain part of the persistence in 
the valuation differences. Arbitrage does not appear to eliminate the residual. Other cases of 
apparent pure or near-pure arbitrage opportunities include gross mispricing of shares in 
equity carve-outs (Lamont and Thaler, 2003), and differences in price for dual-class shares 
with the same entitlements to cash flows (Schultz and Shive, 2010). Lamont and Thaler 
present evidence that the short selling required to exploit arbitrage opportunities in the carve-
outs they study was difficult because of a shortage of lendable shares, although this does not 
explain why some investors were willing to buy the grossly overpriced security. Shultz and 
Shive do not identify any particular obstacles to arbitrage between dual-class shares, but their 
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evidence suggests that arbitrage trading is for some reason limited in scale, despite the 
apparent opportunities for riskfree profit.3 
 
The current paper investigates whether there are persistent arbitrage opportunities in the UK 
gilts and strips markets. Since the introduction of the UK’s Official Gilts Strips Facility in 
December 1997, it has been possible for certain UK gilts to be ‘stripped’. The introduction of 
the Gilts Strips Facility was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to improve liquidity (Bank 
of England, 1997). The conventional gilt is exchanged for its constituent coupon and 
principal cash flows (strips), which can then be traded individually. If there is a valuation 
difference between a conventional gilt and its equivalent strips package, this arbitrage gap 
should be easy to identify and exploit. Yet we find that there are valuation differences 
between gilts and the equivalent strips packages in the UK gilts market. Arbitrage could be 
impeded by transaction costs, giving a false appearance of the failure of the law of one price. 
Our study suggests that persistent arbitrage gaps remain after transaction costs are accounted 
for, and the gaps do not appear to be explained by personal taxes. In particular, we find that 
strips packages tend to be overpriced in relation to the corresponding gilt. The results are 
therefore similar in spirit to those in the papers cited above, and Schultz and Shive (2010) 
also find that it is the less liquid security that tends to be overpriced. The results point 
towards the existence of market inefficiencies or frictions, or behavioural features that are not 
fully understood as yet. Gilt-edged market makers should be well-placed to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities, and it is puzzling why they appear not to do so more effectively. 
                                                 
3
 Other opportunities for arbitrage, in a weaker sense, have been documented for the shares of dual-
listed companies (for example, De Jong, Rosenthal and Van Dijk, 2009) and of closed-end funds (for 
example, Gemmill and Thomas, 2002). The opportunities in these cases are not pure arbitrage, as they 
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A partial explanation for our results could arise from the fact that the strips market is much 
less liquid than the gilts market. We report evidence indicating that strips prices are stale 
compared with gilts prices: strips prices do not change as frequently. The presence of stale 
prices in the strips market increases doubts about the extent to which substantial trades to 
exploit price differentials are feasible in practice. The prices in our dataset are averages 
calculated from the midpoints of bid-ask prices quoted by market makers, and the quoted 
prices are good for trades up to a certain size. But it may not be possible to exploit the 
apparent arbitrage opportunities on a large scale, and perhaps not on a large enough scale to 
be worth the effort. 
 
A question from our findings is why strip packages are overpriced much more often than are 
the corresponding gilts. There is no obvious reason why stale prices should lead to this result. 
The incidence of apparent arbitrage opportunities is positively related to time to maturity of 
the relevant gilt, possibly because more individual transactions are required to implement an 
arbitrage trade, with greater inconvenience and execution risk. The required arbitrage 
position involves short selling the strips packages, and it could be that this is problematic in 
practice. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the Gilt Strips Facility. Section 3 
describes the data and examines the influence of factors which could give the false 
                                                                                                                                                        
require maintaining an open trading position for an uncertain period of time, which therefore involves 
some risks. 
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appearance of violations of the law of one price in the UK gilts and strips markets. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. The Official Gilts Strips Facility 
The Official Gilts Strips Facility, introduced in the UK on 8 December 1997, allows 
conventional gilts to be ‘stripped’ of coupons. The conventional gilt can be exchanged for a 
series of coupon strips and a principal strip which together replicate exactly the cash flows of 
the original gilt and can then be traded separately. For example, the 8% Treasury Stock 2021 
promises a future semi-annual coupon payment of £4 per £100 of face value, payable on 7 
June and 7 December each year until maturity, together with repayment of the face value on 7 
June 2021. An investor who stripped this gilt would therefore receive a number of coupon 
strips corresponding to the remaining coupon payments, and a single principal strip. 
 
The Gilt Strips Facility enables investors, via gilt-edged market makers (GEMMs) or the 
Bank of England, not only to separate coupon-bearing gilts (conventionals) into separately 
tradable zero-coupon and principal instruments (strips), but also to reconstitute strips into the 
original coupon-bearing gilt. It is necessary to hold all the strip components to reconstitute 
the instruments into the original gilt. To facilitate reconstruction, coupon strips are fungible 
in that coupon strips due on the same date are interchangeable regardless of which 
conventional gilt they arose from. GEMMs are obliged to post daily bid and ask prices for 
coupon strips as well as gilts, which ensures that trading is possible within the size limit for 
which a given quote is valid, although our results suggest that quoted prices may, at times, be 
stale.  
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A rationale for allowing stripping is that strips can be used to create synthetic assets whose 
cash flows could not be achieved using only conventional gilts (Ahmad and Lal 2006; 
Grinblatt and Longstaff 2000). Thus strips are useful in hedging interest rate risk. Strips may 
be more attractive to fund managers in that they have higher duration than conventional gilts 
with the same maturity, are more convex, and offer exposure to specific points on the yield 
curve (Deacon, 2000).    
 
The before-tax cash flows of the conventional gilt and the package of the stripped coupons 
and principal are identical. In the absence of transaction costs and tax distortions, therefore, 
the prices of the conventional gilt and the equivalent strip package would be identical in a 
fully efficient capital market. If there are differences in the prices that are not accounted for 
by factors such as liquidity and taxation, and that exceed the transaction costs involved in 
exploiting the price differential, then investors could earn arbitrage profits from suitable 
transactions in the conventional and stripped gilts markets. If the package of strips is 
overpriced compared to the conventional gilt, the strip package could be sold short and the 
proceeds used to purchase the conventional gilt. The conventional gilt would then be stripped 
and the short sale position in each of the strips would be closed. Conversely, if the package of 
strips is underpriced compared to the conventional gilt, the conventional gilt could be sold 
short and the proceeds used to purchase the strip package. The strips would then be 
reconstituted to close the short position in the conventional gilt. A market participant wishing 
to transact a short sale would need to be deemed reliable and creditworthy by the GEMM 
lending the security, which means that such a transaction might not be possible for all 
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participants. But short selling is an established practice in government bond markets, which 
most institutional investors should be able to undertake.4 
 
The requisite trades can be executed almost simultaneously, so any gain from them is almost 
risk-free and can be realised immediately. However, a number of separate transactions in 
strips is necessary to implement an arbitrage trade, and the number is positively related to the 
maturity of the gilt. The investor would need to monitor settlement of the requisite 
transactions. To strip a gilt, for example, the investor would have to transfer the gilt from the 
investor’s Crest (securities depository) account to that of the GEMM, and the GEMM would 
have to transfer the resulting component strips from the GEMM’s account to that of the 
investor. Arranging an arbitrage position would therefore involve an administrative burden. 
In addition, it might be difficult for a short seller of strips to find strips to borrow, since the 
volume of strips outstanding is much lower than the volume of gilts. In practice, the market 
participants best able to carry out arbitrage trades are the GEMMs themselves. 
 
3. Data and results 
3.1. Price differentials ignoring costs of trading and tax 
The data on prices are taken from the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) database for the 
period 08 December 1997 to 25 November 2011 inclusive. The prices are reference prices 
calculated by the DMO from midpoint prices submitted by GEMMs at the end of each 
                                                 
4 According to a review of short selling written on behalf of professional investors, ‘Market 
participants are able to short sell [on an uncovered basis] a government bond to take advantage of a 
trading opportunity with a high degree of confidence of being able to cover that position by borrowing 
the asset when they need to do so. For example, in the UK borrowers typically borrow the bonds 
within 24 hours of selling’ (International Securities Lending Association, 2010, p. 20).  
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trading day.5 A midpoint price should, by its nature, be in between the bid and ask prices 
quoted by the GEMM for the relevant gilt, at which it is willing to trade. Of the 44 
conventional gilts for which data are available, eight were strippable from the beginning of 
the sample period, when the Gilts Stripping Facility was introduced, with further strippable 
gilts issued each year during the sample period (Table 1). The coupons on the strippable gilts 
range from 4.00% to 8.50%, and the remaining times to maturity at the time the gilts entered 
the sample range from 2.95 to 50.00 years. Daily reference prices for the principal and 
coupon strips required to replicate the cash flows of the 44 conventional (strippable) gilts are 
similarly obtained from the DMO database. 6  For each daily price observation for a 
conventional gilt, the value of the corresponding replicating portfolio of principal and coupon 
strips was calculated, giving a total of 65,500 pairs of observations. We exclude 16 outlying 
observations as they appear to be due to obvious data-entry errors.  
 
[TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
To examine the valuation differences, the value of the replicating package of gilt strips is 
compared with the price of the corresponding conventional gilt. We refer to this as the strip-
conventional price differential. The strip package is overvalued in relation to the 
                                                 
5
 ‘At the end of each business day, each GEMM sends the DMO a set of mid-market closing prices 
for those gilts in which it makes markets... From these prices the DMO computes an average price for 
each gilt and then publishes this reference price... For a given gilt the reference price is not intended to 
give a market price at which it could be traded, but provides an indicative price’ (DMO website, 
www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/Daily_Prices, accessed on 11 January 2012). Because an 
average will normally contain higher and lower prices, the data will tend to underestimate any 
arbitrage opportunities that may be present. 
6
 In this respect our dataset is superior to that of Halpern and Rumsey (2000): they have to estimate 
the prices of Canadian strip packages from the term structure of observed bid yields for strips. Also, 
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conventional gilt when the differential is positive, and undervalued when the differential is 
negative. A non-zero strip-conventional price difference does not necessarily give rise to an 
arbitrage opportunity, however, as the costs of arbitrage may exceed the potential benefit. 
Before examining the costs of arbitrage, we consider the extent of the price differentials in 
Table 2.  
 
[TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics about the price differential. The statistics for the 
entire data sample are presented in Panel A. The sample is then segmented into three sub-
periods of equal length, in Panels B through D. Within each panel, the data are also 
segmented by gilt maturity using the standard classification of short (< five years to maturity), 
medium (five to 15 years to maturity) and long (> 15 years to maturity) on the relevant 
observation date.  
 
The mean (median) price differential over the entire sample period is £0.060 (£0.017) per 
£100 of face value, which is significantly different from zero (t = 51.6). This indicates that, 
on average, replicating packages of gilt strips are overvalued relative to the corresponding 
conventional gilt. The mean differential is positive for all gilt maturities in all three sub-
periods. But it is smaller for short-dated gilts than for medium- and long-dated gilts. The 
means by quintile of price differential show that the incidence of large absolute differentials, 
                                                                                                                                                        
both Halpern and Rumsey (2000) and Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) use monthly data, whereas we 
have daily prices. 
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positive or negative, tends to be highest for long-dated gilts. We discuss possible reasons for 
these findings below. 
 
In the Canadian market, bonds were more often overpriced rather than strips packages, until 
about one year after May 1993, the month from which arbitrage trades became much easier to 
execute (Halpern and Rumsey, 2000). There was no difference on average between the prices 
of US bonds and their strip packages during 1990-94 (Grinblatt and Longstaff, 2000).  
 
3.2. Estimation of bid-ask spread 
Data on the typical bid-ask spread for gilt strips is unavailable. Whereas Halpern and Rumsey 
(2000) use a range of possible bid-ask spreads, and Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) ask Wall 
Street traders for estimates of the bid-ask prices, this paper uses actual data to estimate the 
spread. Following Roll (1984), the average bid-ask spread is proxied by the following 
equation: 
 cov2 −=− AskBid  (1) 
where the term cov is the first-order serial covariance of price changes. This first-order serial 
covariance would be expected to be negative if bid-ask bounce were present in the price 
series. 
 
We note that the raw data on both the conventional and replicating packages display positive 
serial dependence due to the presence of an increasing price trend. The following factors may 
potentially explain this upward trend: 
i. drag to par as the gilts move towards maturity, and 
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ii. the sample covers a period when interest rates were generally falling, which would 
have an inverse effect on gilt prices. 
To account for the above factors we follow the procedure outlined below. First we compute 
the ‘expected change in price’, E∆, using gilt yield-curve data published by the Bank of 
England. The expected change in price of £1 face value of a coupon or principal strip 
payment i occurring m years in the future is as follows: 
 
1,1,,,
,1£
−−
−−
−=∆ TiTiTiTiT
ym
e
ym
eE  (2) 
where mi,T is the time (in years) from day t to payment i on day T, and yi,T is the continuously 
compounded yield corresponding to mi,T. The expected change in price for conventional gilt j 
from day t–1 to day t is then simply the sum of the expected changes in price of each of its 
component cashflows: 
 TjTtj CEE ,,1£, ∑ ∆=∆  (3) 
where Cj,T is the cashflow to gilt j on day T. For both the conventional gilt and each 
individual strip component, E∆t  is deducted from the observed daily change in gilt prices to 
obtain the unexpected change in price as follows: 
tjtttj EppU ,1, ∆−−=∆ −  (4) 
where U∆j,t is the unexpected change in gilt price j from day t-1 to day t, and pt is the price of 
the gilt on day t. 
 
Using the computed values of the unexpected changes in prices, we calculate the one trading-
day serial covariance of unexpected returns for each of the strip packages and the 
conventional gilts. Only one strip package, the long-dated coupon strip maturing 7 June 2032, 
exhibits positive serial covariance. For this coupon strip, the Roll methodology fails. For each 
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of the remaining gilts and strips packages in the sample, the one-trading-day serial covariance 
is negative as expected, and we use the Roll methodology to calculate the implied bid-ask 
spreads.   
 
The resulting implied bid-ask spread to execute an arbitrage trade, rounded to the nearest 
basis point, is ten basis points. The actual bid-ask spreads faced by individual traders in the 
gilt market will vary based on the identity of the trader and the size of the transaction, as well 
as market conditions at the time, hence we consider it appropriate to use an average value of 
ten basis points to approximate the bid-ask spread when interpreting whether the extent of the 
strip-conventional price differentials highlighted in Table 2 may represent unexploited 
arbitrage opportunities. 
 
3.3. Price differentials net of bid-ask spread 
 
[TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
Table 3 reports the number of observations, by time to maturity of the conventional gilt, in 
which the price differential exceeds the implied bid-ask spread of £0.10 per £100 of face 
value. The mean differentials net of the spread are also reported for each maturity category. 
The means of positive and negative values of the differential are reported separately in order 
to highlight possible maturity bands for which strips packages are systematically overvalued 
or undervalued in relation to the corresponding conventional gilt. This may occur, for 
example, if there is particular demand from investors for zero-coupon gilt strips falling in 
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specific maturity bands. Table 3 indicates that price differentials persist even after accounting 
for the bid-ask spread, highlighting a possible violation of the law of one price. 
 
After adjusting for the spread, the gilt is underpriced (strips overpriced) in 13,821 cases and 
overpriced in 3,651 cases. The price differential is within the spread for the remaining 48,028 
cases. Whilst there are many cases across all maturities where conventional gilts are both 
underpriced or overpriced, patterns can be observed in the relative frequencies of positive and 
negative strip-conventional price differentials. The proportion of observations in which the 
differential is within the spread tends to decrease with time to maturity of the gilt, especially 
for gilts with longer than seven years to maturity. Ninety-nine percent of the differentials are 
within the spread for gilts with less than one year to maturity, compared with 25% for gilts 
with between 40 and 50 years to maturity. The proportion of overpriced strips is higher than 
the proportion of overpriced gilts for all maturities except two to four years. The relationship 
between the proportion of overpriced strips and maturity increases almost monotonically, but 
the proportion of overpriced gilts stays below 8% for maturities of up to 30 years, and then 
jumps to 15% for maturities of 30 to 40 years, and 34% for maturities of 40 to 50 years.  
 
The means of the price differentials by maturity category show that the largest differentials 
are found in maturities of 30 years or more for gilts (ignoring the two observations for gilts of 
less than one year). These overpriced long-maturity gilts account for 39% of all the 
overpriced gilts. For overpriced strips, the largest mean price differentials are for the shorter 
maturities, of up to four years. However, such overpriced short-maturity strips only account 
for 2% of all the overpriced strips. The bulk of the overpriced strips arise at maturities of at 
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least 10 years, and the mean differential net of the spread for these overpriced strips is quite 
high (around £0.20 per £100). 
 
There are two potential additional costs facing an investor engaging in arbitrage, namely 
capital gains tax on the arbitrage gain, and commission costs. These costs will differ 
substantially depending on the type of investor. For example, an individual might have to pay 
tax on an arbitrage gain whereas a tax-exempt investor such as a pension fund will pay no tax. 
The percentage commissions on large institutional trades, if any, are very much lower than on 
trades of a few thousand pounds by individuals, and a market-maker will pay zero 
commission. A high tax-bracket individual investor is likely to face the highest cost of 
arbitrage. 
 
[TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
To illustrate the potential maximum impact of capital gains tax and commission, Table 4 
shows the potential profits available from arbitrage trades of £10,000 in three gilts and their 
strips packages, with a differing trade date for each gilt. The gross gains in the table are at the 
high end of the sample, but they are by no means the largest gains. The costs consist of 
capital gains tax on the arbitrage gain, at the then prevailing rate of 40%, and trading 
commission of 0.5375% on the £10,000, as well as the estimated bid-ask spread. The costs 
combined absorb between 68% and 98% of the potential gains, so they are substantial. 
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However, we emphasise that these costs represent a maximum; institutional investors and 
GEMMs will face much lower costs.7 
 
3.4. Do prices differentials induce arbitrage trades? 
 
[TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
We examine next whether there is a connection between the extent of price differentials and 
possible arbitrage trades. Table 5 shows for each gilt in the sample the frequency of positive 
and negative price differentials net of the bid-ask spread, their average magnitude, and 
stripping and reconstitution activity levels for the period from 29 September 2003 for which 
stripping data are available. The reason for examining individual gilts here in Table 5 is to 
allow a comparison to be made between the level of stripping and reconstitution activity, and 
the extent of both underpricing and overpricing of the gilts. If there is a high level of 
stripping/reconstitution activity, arbitrage might be occurring and opportunities for gain 
might be eliminated fairly rapidly. We might therefore expect to observe smaller price 
differentials for strippable gilts where the level of stripping and reconstitution activity is high. 
Alternatively, it is possible that arbitrageurs will only engage in trading if the price 
differential is particularly large, and a higher mean differential may therefore persist even 
where the level of stripping/reconstitution activity is high. 
 
                                                 
7
 Neither Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) nor Halpern and Rumsey (2000) mention either capital gains 
tax on arbitrage gains, or trading commissions. 
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The table shows the mean price differential for days on which the gilt is overpriced, and for 
days on which it is underpriced. There is a significantly positive correlation coefficient of 
0.294 (0.323) between the mean price differential and levels of stripping (reconstituting) 
activity for days on which the gilt is underpriced, and no significant relation for days on the 
gilt is overpriced. This is a crude measure because the mean differential and percentage 
stripped for each gilt are numbers calculated for the whole sample period. But the positive 
coefficient suggests that when the overpricing of strips is relatively high, both stripping and 
reconstituting take place, potentially to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity. Grinblatt 
and Longstaff (2000, Table 4), on the other hand, find for the US market no relation between 
the proportion stripped per month and the price differential at the start of the month, and so 
they argue that the price differential does not induce arbitrage trading. 
 
A further point evident in Table 5 is that the proportions of gilts that are stripped or 
reconstituted per year are very low, mostly less than 2%.8 This compares with an average 
proportion stripped per month of 1.9% in Grinblatt and Longstaff’s sample, which 
presumably gives a proportion stripped per year of 23%, much higher than for the UK.9 If 
trading does take place to try to exploit arbitrage gaps in the UK market, it is on a small scale 
compared with the size of the gilts market. 
 
[TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
                                                 
8
 Six per cent of 6½% Treasury 2003 was stripped during the last ten weeks of its life, giving an 
annualised rate of stripping of 31%. We exclude this outlier from Table 5 as the figure is derived from 
a relatively small number of days. 
9
 Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000, p. 1416) argue that the primary reason for the substantial stripping 
activity in the US market is not arbitrage, but ‘fundamental economic functions in completing the 
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The difficulty of taking advantage of a price differential could be related to the maturity of 
the relevant gilt. A longer maturity requires more transactions in separate strips, which could 
imply greater inconvenience and execution risk, as mentioned in Section 2. If this is an 
important consideration, the incidence of apparent arbitrage opportunities should be 
positively related to the time to maturity of the relevant gilt.10 We see from Table 3 that the 
incidence of arbitrage opportunities does increase strongly with time to maturity, especially 
for overpriced strips. The regression results presented in Table 6 further support a positive 
relationship between price differentials and maturity. The signed price differential and 
absolute value of the differential are both positively related to the number of strips in the strip 
package, and therefore to the maturity of the relevant gilt. So one reason for arbitrage gaps in 
gilts with substantial time to maturity could be difficulty of implementing the arbitrage trades. 
The remainder of the paper examines several other possible reasons for the existence of 
arbitrage gaps. 
 
3.5. Illiquidity in the strips market 
 
[FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
The strips market is much less liquid than the gilts market. Turnover in strips has declined 
over time, as can be seen from Figure 1, and only small proportions of gilts are stripped, as 
                                                                                                                                                        
market and overcoming frictions’. A question remaining is why stripping activity is so much higher in 
the USA than in the UK. 
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noted above. In the first quarter of 2002 turnover was £442.1bn in fixed-coupon gilts and 
£2.2bn in strips, and in the first quarter of 2011 turnover was £1,434.6bn in gilts and £0.1bn 
in strips (source: DMO website). The current section presents the results of several tests 
designed to discover whether illiquidity affects the reported strips prices from the DMO, and 
whether illiquidity might explain the apparent unexploited arbitrage opportunities that we 
have found.  
 
The liquidity of an asset and its price are expected to be positively related, other things being 
equal. This is intuitive, and it is predicted by mainstream models of the impact of liquidity, 
such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Since strips are less liquid than gilts, we would 
expect a strips package to be underpriced compared with the relevant gilt. However, we have 
seen that strips packages tend to be overpriced compared with the gilt, and that the 
overpricing of strips is more common for medium and long gilts, for which more trades in 
strips are required in order to reconstitute the gilt.  
 
Our finding that strips tend to be overpriced is in line with the evidence of Schultz and Shive 
(2010) regarding ‘mispricing’ (price differences) of dual-class shares with the same rights to 
cash flows. The shares with enhanced voting rights are less liquid than the normal shares, but 
it is the high-vote shares that tend to have the temporary higher price when the prices differ, 
despite their lower liquidity. The authors present evidence that temporary higher prices are 
not a reflection of any value of the extra votes. They note, as we do, that their findings are 
counterintuitive. They also present evidence that it is standard one-sided trades that eliminate 
                                                                                                                                                        
10
 It is also the case that bid-ask spreads are positively related to the maturity of the gilt. This is not 
allowed for in our results as we assume the same spread for all would-be arbitrage transactions. We 
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price differences, rather than two-sided long-short arbitrage trades, and they conjecture that 
there are difficulties in transacting arbitrage trades. In our sample, an arbitrageur seeking to 
exploit an overpriced strips package would have to sell short the strips. This is likely to be 
more difficult than selling short an overpriced gilt, which could help explain why it is strips 
which tend to be overpriced. 
 
A different potential impact of illiquidity is on the synchronicity of prices. The prices quoted 
by GEMMs in the strips market might tend to be ‘stale’ in relation to gilts prices, ie strips 
prices might not change as frequently, because trades in strips are less frequent. The difficulty 
of trading in large amounts at the quoted prices, to exploit an arbitrage gap, is likely to be 
greater if the quoted prices tend to be stale. To investigate whether strips prices are stale, we 
run two tests that are similar to tests in Ahn, Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2002), 
who compare stock-index prices with index futures prices.11 The first test is to compare the 
autocorrelation of daily returns; prices which are stale should result in a higher positive 
autocorrelation of returns. The second test is to estimate the following regression model for 
each gilt and strips package: 
 Rstripj,t+1 – Rgiltj,t+1  =  αj + βjRgiltj,t + ej,t+1 (5) 
where Rgiltj,t is the return on the gilt j on day t, Rstripj,t+1 is the return on the corresponding strip 
package, and ej,t+1 is the error term. If strips prices are stale, ie they lag the prices for the gilt, 
the βj coefficient should be positive. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
thank the referee for pointing this out. 
11
 A third test in Ahn et al (2002) requires data on daily trading volume, which we do not have. 
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Ahn et al (p. 673) argue that, if transaction costs impede arbitrage, different patterns of 
returns, including different autocorrelations and lead-lag relations, can prevail in pairs of 
assets whose prices should be locked together by arbitrage. The markets for each asset will be 
separate, to an extent. So, in the first test, impeded arbitrage leads to no prediction for the 
difference in autocorrelations, whereas stale strips prices imply greater autocorrelation of 
strips returns. Similarly, in the second test, impeded arbitrage leads to no prediction for the 
sign of βj in equation (5), whereas stale strips prices imply a positive sign. Therefore, the 
higher the proportions of positive strips-gilt autocorrelation differences, and of positive betas, 
across the sample of gilts, the stronger the evidence for stale prices. 
 
[TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
The results of the tests are presented in Table 7. Both the gilts and the strips returns display 
positive autocorrelation in the majority of cases, and the coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 10% level or more for 14 of the 44 gilts and 19 of the equivalent strips 
packages. Drag to par as the gilts move towards maturity is a factor which induces positive 
autocorrelation in both gilts and strips returns, as noted above. The autocorrelations are 
higher for 33 of the strips, but only seven of the differences are significant at the 10% level or 
more. We also calculate autocorrelations for returns with lags from two days up to five days 
(not shown). There is no clear difference between the autocorrelations for strips and gilts for 
the longer lags. Overall, the differences in the autocorrelations provide moderately strong 
evidence that strips prices are stale. 
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The evidence from the second test, equation (5), is stronger. All the beta coefficients are 
positive as would be expected if strips prices are more stale than the prices of conventional 
gilts, and all except one are highly significant at the 1% level or more. The results of both 
tests point in the same direction, and so we conclude that strips prices have a tendency to lag 
gilts prices.12 
 
If the strips market is illiquid, and lack of arbitrage means that prices are not closely tied to 
gilts prices, then demand pressure for certain strips could have an observable impact on their 
price. It is plausible that the demand for a package of gilt strips is at its greatest when the gilt 
first becomes strippable. In some cases, strips will become available with new maturity dates, 
not previously covered by existing strips, and there might be one-off demand from investors 
seeking zero-coupon securities with such maturity dates. In order to test this idea, we 
calculate the percentage of price differentials in which the strips package is overpriced during 
the first year in which the relevant gilt became strippable, and the mean of all the price 
differentials, positive and negative, during this first year. 30.7% (11.4%) of the strips are 
overpriced (underpriced) during the first year the gilt is strippable, compared with 18.5% 
(4.5%) during subsequent years. The mean price differential is £0.054 for the first year, and 
£0.037 for subsequent years. The differences between these numbers are highly significant. 
They support the hypothesis that the attraction of strips is greatest when they first become 
available, and that demand-induced price differentials are not fully arbitraged away. Demand 
                                                 
12
 The DMO itself may have been concerned about stale prices from GEMMs, as it has recently 
changed the source of its prices for strips. ‘From 3 October 2011, prices for STRIPS are calculated 
using the DMO's yield curve; these prices are not intended to represent market prices at which the 
securities could be traded (previous to this date, prices are based on end-of-day market price 
contributions by the GEMMs).’ http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/Daily_Prices 
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pressure plus lack of arbitrage is also Lamont and Thaler’s (2003) diagnosis of mispricing in 
certain equity carve-outs. 
 
Finally, we investigate whether changes in liquidity over time, or differences in liquidity 
across strips packages, affect price differentials. We divide the sample period into three, as in 
Table 2, and compare the first subperiod with the last subperiod. If illiquidity is a cause of 
price differentials, we might expect the differentials to be greater in size and frequency 
during the last subperiod, as the lack of liquidity makes it harder to exploit apparent arbitrage 
opportunities. The results are in Table 8. The median differential is larger in the last 
subperiod for both overpriced strips and overpriced gilts, although the mean for overpriced 
strips is larger in the first subperiod. The percentages of observations for both overpriced 
strips and overpriced gilts are significantly higher for the later period. These findings provide 
some evidence that the decline in the liquidity of strips has increased the number of arbitrage 
opportunities which are not exploited. 
 
Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) find a positive relation between the price differential and the 
total proportion of the relevant bond that is held in stripped form. They interpret this as 
evidence for a liquidity effect on prices; a greater proportion held in stripped form implies 
greater liquidity in the relevant strips, and this is associated with a higher price for the strip 
package in relation to the price of the equivalent bond. In unreported analysis, we replicate 
the regression in Grinblatt and Longstaff’s Table 3, using weekly and monthly observations. 
This regression tests for a relationship between the price differential and the proportion of the 
bond held in stripped form at a given date, in the presence of variables designed to control for 
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the effects of possible measurement errors in the data.13 The coefficient on the proportion 
held in stripped form is negative, which is not the expected sign, but it is not significant in 
either the weekly or monthly regression. The lack of explanatory power for this variable is 
perhaps not surprising, given the low proportions of UK gilts held in stripped form.14 
 
3.6. Taxation 
Gilts and strips are not taxed in an identical manner. Hence, whilst the cash flows of the 
conventional gilt and a package of the strips are identical before tax, they might not be 
identical after tax. This may lead, in the absence of arbitrage, to differences in trading value 
between conventional gilts and their corresponding packages of strips. However, the impact 
of tax is difficult to predict a priori. The types of investor which owned the largest amounts 
of gilts during the sample period are pension funds, life-assurance companies, and overseas 
investors. Pension funds are exempt from tax. Life companies receive interest gross of tax 
and then account for tax under a complicated ‘investment income less expenses’ regime, 
under which the tax paid on interest, if any, varies depending on the circumstances of the 
relevant life company. Overseas investors receive interest gross, and the tax they pay also 
varies depending on the investor. Individual investors own about 10% of the market, and 
interest on gilts is taxed as top-slice income. But many individuals will not pay any tax on 
                                                 
13
 The control variables are (i) the lagged value of the price differential, (ii) the change in the price of 
the gilt during the previous period, and (iii) the square of the change in this price. The rationale for 
these variables is discussed in Grinblatt & Longstaff (2000, pp. 1426-28). 
14
 These regression results are available from the corresponding author on request. 
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their interest, because, for example, their gilts are held in a tax-exempt Individual Savings 
Account (ISA). Capital gains on gilts were exempt from tax during the sample period.15 
 
Gains on holdings of gilt strips are treated as income. Investors are deemed to sell their strips 
on 5 April and repurchase on 6 April each year (6 April being the first day of the new UK tax 
year), and any resulting gains or losses are taxed as income. The amount of tax payable by 
investors in strips will depend on the gain in the strip price, if any, during the relevant tax 
year. If the coupon rate on a given gilt exceeds the yield on the gilt, investors paying income 
tax should prefer to hold the gilt in the form of strips (unless they can offset the expected 
capital loss over time on the gilt against capital gains tax). If the coupon rate is below the 
yield, the gilt should be preferred, as some of the return will be in tax-exempt capital gain 
(though this is not certain unless the gilt is held to maturity). On average over time, and in the 
absence of arbitrage, the tax argument would lead us to expect high-coupon gilts to be less 
highly priced in relation to the equivalent strips package than low-coupon gilts. 
 
[TABLE 9 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
We first examine whether there is any relation between price differentials (net of the spread) 
and the coupon rate of the gilt. Table 9 shows mean price differentials for overpriced and 
underpriced gilts sorted by coupon. According to the preceding tax argument, high-coupon 
gilts should be more underpriced, or less overpriced, than low-coupon gilts. But there are no 
clear patterns. The proportion of overpriced strips is higher than the proportion of overpriced 
                                                 
15 The taxation of gilts and strips is summarised briefly on the DMO website: 
www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/Gilts_Tax. For more detail, and for estimates regarding gilts 
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gilts for all categories of coupon. The proportion is highest for low-coupon gilts, which goes 
against the tax argument. There is no relationship between the mean price differentials and 
the coupon for either gilts or strips.  
 
As a further test, we regress the price differential on the coupon rate of the gilt minus the 
prevailing yield on the gilt: 
 PDj,t  =  αj + βj(CRj,t – Yj,t) + ej,t (7) 
where PDj,t is the price of the strips package for gilt j on day t minus the price of gilt j, CRj,t is 
the coupon rate, Yj,t is the yield to maturity, and ej,t is the error term. If a higher value for 
coupon rate minus yield implies a greater tax disadvantage for the gilt, the coefficient on 
(CRj,t – Yj,t) should be positive. However, the coefficient is negative and significant (t = –
12.6). Overall, our results suggest that tax cannot explain the price differentials that we 
observe. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines price differentials between conventional gilts and their equivalent strips 
packages and finds that differentials exist after allowing for the bid-ask spread. If it is 
conjectured that transactions costs are not fully captured by the bid-ask spread in an illiquid 
market, then liquidity could play a role in explaining the apparent opportunities for arbitrage 
even after taking into account the bid-ask spread entailed in attempts at realising arbitrage 
profits. UK gilts are highly liquid, but the levels of stripping and reconstitution are low, and 
liquidity is much lower in the strips market. We find that strips are more often overpriced 
than underpriced compared with the relevant gilt, despite their lower liquidity. This could be 
                                                                                                                                                        
ownership, see Armitage (2004). Ownership data are also available from the DMO website. 
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because of difficulties in short-selling strips in order to take advantage of the overpricing. 
The frequency of price differentials, in both directions, increases with the time to maturity of 
the gilt, which suggests that arbitrage becomes more problematic as the required number of 
transactions in individual strips increases. We find some evidence that the decline in the 
liquidity of the strips market has increased the likelihood that arbitrage opportunities are not 
exploited. The evidence does not support a tax-based explanation for the differentials. 
 
There is no reason to believe that trades in strip packages cannot be transacted at or within 
the bid-ask spread that we have estimated. However, we find evidence that strips prices tend 
to lag gilts prices, presumably because of the lower liquidity of the strips market. Stale prices 
in strips imply that opportunities for arbitrage apparent in the data could not always be 
exploited in practice. So this is a probable explanation for at least some of the apparent 
arbitrage opportunities. But the strips package is overpriced, allowing for bid-ask spread, in 
13,821 (21.1%) of our sample of price differentials, compared with 3,651 (5.6%) in which the 
gilt is overpriced. Stale prices lead to no prediction about the sign of the price differentials, 
and so it is unlikely that stale prices are the reason for the much higher frequency of 
overpricing in strips packages. We infer that many of the arbitrage gaps in our sample are not 
due to stale strips prices, and so the results of this study represent an anomaly for those who 
are persuaded that the law of one price must hold in the financial markets. As Schultz & 
Shive (2010) conclude for dual-class shares, and as Grinblatt & Longstaff (2000) conclude 
for the US bond market, our evidence from the UK gilts market points towards limits to 
arbitrage activity in financial markets, and the limits are not fully understood. 
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Table 1 
UK strippable gilts during 8 December 1997 to 25 November 2011 
 
The gilts are sorted by redemption date. Observations = the number of trading days in the sample period, 
and the number of price differentials, for the relevant gilt. 
 
Name of Gilt Redemption date Strippable from Observations 
8% Treasury Stock 2000 07-Dec-00 08-Dec-97 757 
7% Treasury Stock 2002 07-Jun-02 08-Dec-97 1132 
6½% Treasury Stock 2003 07-Dec-03 11-Dec-97 1511 
5% Treasury Stock 2004 07-Jun-04 23-Jun-99 1250 
8½% Treasury Stock 2005 07-Dec-05 08-Dec-97 2020 
7½% Treasury Stock 2006 07-Dec-06 08-Dec-97 2273 
4½% Treasury Stock 2007 07-Mar-07 25-Mar-04 745 
7¼% Treasury Stock 2007 07-Dec-07 08-Dec-97 2526 
5% Treasury Stock 2008 07-Mar-08 09-Sep-02 1391 
4% Treasury Stock 2009 07-Mar-09 27-Jun-03 1442 
5¾% Treasury Stock 2009 07-Dec-09 30-Jul-98 2870 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2010 07-Jun-10 21-Jan-05 1357 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2011 07-Mar-11 27-Jan-06 1291 
3¼% Treasury Gilt 2011 07-Dec-11 19-Dec-08 741 
5% Treasury Stock 2012 07-Mar-12 02-Apr-02 2442 
5¼% Treasury Gilt 2012 07-Jun-12 22-Jun-07 1122 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2013 07-Mar-13 13-Jun-08 875 
2¼% Treasury Gilt 2014 07-Mar-14 17-Apr-09 661 
5% Treasury Stock 2014 07-Sep-14 23-Oct-02 2285 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2015 07-Sep-15 30-Oct-03 2042 
8% Treasury Stock 2015 07-Dec-15 08-Dec-97 3529 
4% Treasury Gilt 2016 07-Sep-16 26-May-06 1393 
5% Treasury Gilt 2018 07-Mar-18 10-Aug-07 1087 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2019 07-Mar-19 21-Nov-08 760 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2019 07-Sep-19 12-Aug-09 580 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2020 07-Mar-20 08-Jun-05 1638 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2020 07-Sep-20 07-Jul-10 353 
8% Treasury Stock 2021 07-Jun-21 08-Dec-97 3529 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2021 07-Sep-21 06-Apr-11 162 
4% Treasury Gilt 2022 07-Mar-22 29-Apr-09 653 
5% Treasury Stock 2025 07-Mar-25 02-Apr-02 2442 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2027 07-Dec-27 06-Dec-06 1257 
6% Treasury Stock 2028 07-Dec-28 21-May-98 3417 
4¾% Treasury Gilt 2030 07-Dec-30 09-Jan-08 982 
4¼% Treasury Stock 2032 07-Jun-32 28-Sep-00 2821 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2034 07-Sep-34 07-Sep-09 552 
4¼% Treasury Stock 2036 07-Mar-36 29-May-03 2151 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2038 07-Dec-38 28-May-04 1897 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2039 07-Sep-39 03-Jul-09 608 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2040 07-Dec-40 07-Dec-10 245 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2042 07-Dec-42 12-Sep-07 1065 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2046 07-Dec-46 08-Jun-06 1385 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2049 07-Dec-49 03-Dec-08 753 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2055 07-Dec-55 08-Dec-05 1508 
  TOTAL 65500 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the strip-conventional price differential 
 
The strip-conventional price differential is the price in £ of a replicating package of strips minus 
the price of the relevant conventional gilt, with a face value of £100. Daily prices of gilts and 
principal and coupon strips were obtained from the UK Debt Management Office, and we 
calculate the daily values of replicating packages from the strip prices. 
 
PANEL A: Entire Sample Period (08 December 1997 to 25 November 2011 inclusive)
Percentile
Mean 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 Skewness Kurtosis
All gilts 0.060 -0.061 -0.012 0.017 0.064 0.191 7.337 79.529
Short 0.022 -0.052 -0.020 -0.004 0.015 0.053 10.740 131.733
Medium 0.074 -0.051 -0.004 0.030 0.072 0.170 8.427 92.641
Long 0.095 -0.101 0.013 0.072 0.139 0.296 4.556 44.866
PANEL B: 08 December 1997 to 03 August 2002 inclusive
Percentile
Mean 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 Skewness Kurtosis
All gilts 0.080 -0.039 0.002 0.031 0.069 0.151 8.565 82.913
Short 0.056 -0.029 -0.003 0.014 0.037 0.076 9.462 95.058
Medium 0.101 -0.042 0.014 0.050 0.086 0.148 8.088 75.700
Long 0.102 -0.077 0.019 0.074 0.122 0.208 7.704 72.566
PANEL C: 04 August 2002 to 31 March 2007 inclusive
Percentile
Mean 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 Skewness Kurtosis
All gilts 0.012 -0.070 -0.025 -0.003 0.023 0.090 8.291 105.329
Short 0.005 -0.064 -0.031 -0.014 0.001 0.023 11.148 140.456
Medium 0.032 -0.056 -0.020 0.003 0.028 0.078 11.328 146.217
Long 0.007 -0.137 -0.011 0.030 0.070 0.135 4.443 60.092
PANEL D: 01 April 2007 to 25 November 2011 inclusive
Percentile
Mean 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 Skewness Kurtosis
All gilts 0.084 -0.060 -0.007 0.031 0.099 0.268 5.679 53.939
Short 0.018 -0.049 -0.018 -0.004 0.016 0.057 10.367 130.841
Medium 0.089 -0.049 0.007 0.046 0.096 0.216 7.041 75.481
Long 0.138 -0.097 0.036 0.110 0.196 0.366 3.583 27.720
 
 
 33
Table 3 
Mean price differentials per £100 for overpriced and underpriced gilts,  
net of estimated bid-ask spread, sorted by maturity of conventional gilt 
 
‘Conventional overpriced’ (strips package underpriced) means that strip-conventional price differential is below the estimated bid-ask 
spread of 10bp or £0.10. ‘Conventional underpriced’ (strips package overpriced) means that the price differential is greater than £0.10. 
 
Conventional Overpriced Conventional Underpriced Difference < t-statistic for Z-statistic for
Remaining Time Bid-Ask Spread difference in difference in
to Maturity Mean Price Mean Price means of absolute price numbers over
(TTM) / years Observations % Differential (£) Observations % Differential (£) Observations % differentials and underpriced
≤1 2 0.05% -0.8974 30 0.78% 2.773 3,800 99.16% -2.127 -4.9681
1 < TTM ≤ 2 11 0.26% -0.0525 35 0.83% 2.762 4,179 98.91% -16.645 -3.5509
2 < TTM ≤ 3 273 6.05% -0.0976 67 1.48% 1.432 4,172 92.46% -8.043 11.4713
3 < TTM ≤ 4 96 2.34% -0.0737 94 2.29% 0.907 3,916 95.37% -6.118 0.1468
4 < TTM ≤ 5 157 3.61% -0.0763 342 7.86% 0.460 3,852 88.53% -8.533 -8.5658
5 < TTM ≤ 6 143 4.86% -0.1667 235 7.98% 0.545 2,567 87.16% -5.878 -4.9015
6 < TTM ≤ 7 84 3.42% -0.1548 145 5.91% 0.379 2,226 90.67% -2.669 -4.1356
7 < TTM ≤ 8 53 1.91% -0.1152 417 15.04% 0.198 2,302 83.04% -1.937 -18.0593
8 < TTM ≤ 9 29 0.96% -0.0499 456 15.12% 0.187 2,531 83.92% -3.883 -20.9410
9 < TTM ≤ 10 156 4.88% -0.1197 526 16.47% 0.220 2,512 78.65% -3.845 -15.2617
10 < TTM ≤ 15 268 4.10% -0.1017 1,885 28.81% 0.253 4,391 67.10% -10.216 -40.4370
15 < TTM ≤ 20 409 7.74% -0.1863 1,967 37.23% 0.148 2,908 55.03% 2.786 -38.8034
20 < TTM ≤ 30 542 4.89% -0.1413 4,562 41.13% 0.177 5,987 53.98% -3.661 -71.0526
30 < TTM ≤ 40 784 14.85% -0.2528 2,284 43.25% 0.193 2,213 41.90% 4.530 -33.8488
40 < TTM ≤ 50 644 34.04% -0.2958 776 41.01% 0.345 472 24.95% -2.343 -4.4434
Total 3,651 13,821 48,028
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Table 4 
Potential profit from arbitrage net of capital gains tax, commission, and bid-ask spread: 
three examples 
 
The table shows the gain from arbitrage trades in three gilts and their equivalent strips packages, 
on the dates shown. The trades are (i) short-sell the relevant strips, (ii) purchase £10,000 face 
value of the gilt, and (iii) strip the gilt and close out the short positions in the strips. The column 
headed ‘Gross gain’ shows the gain from these trades before tax and transaction costs. The gain 
is positive in each case, indicating that the gilt is underpriced in relation to its strips package. 
‘Tax @ 40%’ shows the capital gains tax liability on the difference between the cash raised from 
short-selling the strips and the sum invested in the relevant gilt (and it assumes that tax is 
calculated on the gain gross of transaction costs). Commission is assumed to be charged at a rate 
of £35 on the first £5,000 transacted, and 0.375% on the amount in excess of £5,000, both on the 
sale of the strips and the purchase of the conventional gilt.1 ‘Bid-ask spread’ shows the estimated 
cost of selling the strips at the bid and buying the gilts at the ask.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade date 
 
Gross 
arbitrage 
gain (£) 
  
 
Tax @ 
40% (£) 
 
 
Commiss-
ion (£) 
 
 
Bid-ask 
spread (£) 
 
Net 
arbitrage 
gain (£) 
8½%  
Treasury 
Stock 2005 
27 May 2005 426.78 -170.71 -110.50 -10.00 135.57 
5% Treasury 
Stock 2012 
 7 September 
2007 249.24 -99.70 -113.30 -5.00 31.24 
5% Treasury 
Stock 2014 
29 August 
2006 247.70 -99.08 -110.27 -14.00 24.35 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Commission rates are available from 
http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/FAQ#Gilt_Purchase_and_Sale_Service  
 
2. The bid-ask spreads on these three gilts are from estimates on the DMO website: 
http://www.dmo.gov.uk/objectView.aspx?format=exceld&id=68863300&page=Gilts/Retail_
Brokerage 
Using our 10bp estimate of the spread, the spread in the three examples would be £10. 
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Table 5 
Mean price differentials by gilt, net of bid-ask spread, 
with % stripped and % reconstituted, sorted by % stripped per year 
  
Note: data for stripping and reconstitution are available for dates from 29 September 2003 only. 
 
 
 
Conventional 
overpriced 
Conventional 
underpriced 
t-statistic 
for 
difference 
in 
absolute 
value of 
means
2
 
% 
stripp-
ed per 
year3 
% 
recon-
stituted 
per 
year3 Gilt 
No. 
of 
days1 
Mean 
price 
differ-
ential 
No. 
of 
days1 
Mean 
price 
differ-
ential 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2020 31 -0.0639 86 0.4429 -9.19 0.000% 0.000% 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2034 14 -0.1172 432 0.2032 -4.24 0.000% 0.000% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2039 45 -0.1483 356 0.1812 -1.14 0.000% 0.000% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2040 5 -0.0294 228 0.3545 -12.92 0.000% 0.000% 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2019 26 -0.1068 163 0.2195 -2.80 0.009% 0.000% 
2¼% Treasury Gilt 2014 30 -0.0472 116 0.4977 -11.67 0.021% 0.001% 
4% Treasury Gilt 2022 43 -0.0760 202 0.2295 -5.35 0.025% 0.003% 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2021 0 - 132 0.2444 - 0.037% 0.000% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2046 300 -0.2099 655 0.2145 -0.31 0.040% 0.008% 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2042 126 -0.1593 635 0.2333 -3.93 0.058% 0.018% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2049 157 -0.2272 418 0.3697 -3.75 0.062% 0.026% 
5¼% Treasury Gilt 2012 31 -0.0427 24 0.9461 -3.46 0.068% 0.028% 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2013 25 -0.1109 79 0.2204 -1.36 0.082% 0.045% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2027 88 -0.2175 715 0.1193 4.90 0.092% 0.033% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2055 453 -0.3009 633 0.2547 2.66 0.098% 0.028% 
3¼% Treasury Gilt 2011 83 -0.0848 23 0.5136 -3.38 0.110% 0.055% 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2019 10 -0.0890 252 0.1636 -1.77 0.125% 0.098% 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2011 1 -0.2119 38 0.8850 - 0.143% 0.108% 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2020 54 -0.0461 361 0.1738 -5.76 0.186% 0.174% 
5% Treasury Stock 2008 12 -0.0522 32 0.7722 -3.66 0.251% 0.291% 
4¾% Treasury Gilt 2030 58 -0.1299 534 0.2232 -4.33 0.258% 0.120% 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2010 90 -0.1470 10 2.2687 -264.42 0.294% 0.143% 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2038 333 -0.3852 757 0.1489 9.75 0.374% 0.113% 
4% Treasury Stock 2009 42 -0.1241 57 0.7938 -9.06 0.378% 0.202% 
4% Treasury Gilt 2016 59 -0.1435 66 0.3306 -2.14 0.381% 0.203% 
5% Treasury Stock 2025 160 -0.1536 476 0.1624 -0.37 0.401% 0.331% 
5% Treasury Stock 2014 74 -0.1023 55 0.7213 -4.24 0.404% 0.328% 
5% Treasury Gilt 2018 81 -0.0919 196 0.2284 -3.20 0.455% 0.354% 
6% Treasury Stock 2028 233 -0.2185 1,272 0.1778 2.16 0.517% 0.470% 
5% Treasury Stock 2012 38 -0.0237 27 1.4531 -6.48 0.553% 0.507% 
    
 36
 
Table 5 continued 
 
5¾% Treasury Stock 2009 51 -0.0412 204 0.6553 -10.66 0.638% 0.620% 
4¼% Treasury Stock 2036 179 -0.1537 677 0.1270 1.15 0.673% 0.350% 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2015 55 -0.1325 168 0.3002 -3.28 0.839% 0.584% 
4½% Treasury Stock 2007 107 -0.1456 7 2.1691 -163.95 0.986% 0.944% 
8% Treasury Stock 2021 164 -0.1475 1,429 0.1812 -1.63 1.122% 1.212% 
7½% Treasury Stock 2006 22 -0.0212 157 0.4838 -4.91 1.138% 1.109% 
8½% Treasury Stock 2005 33 -0.0197 150 0.5052 -4.54 1.210% 0.922% 
8% Treasury Stock 2015 175 -0.1121 755 0.2032 -3.18 1.324% 1.895% 
7¼% Treasury Stock 2007 19 -0.0274 168 0.4841 -5.13 1.456% 1.528% 
4¼% Treasury Stock 2032 129 -0.1197 783 0.1247 -0.26 1.563% 1.515% 
5% Treasury Stock 2004 6 -0.0074 119 0.3298 -5.56 4.331% 3.503% 
6½% Treasury Stock 2003 6 -0.5256 130 0.3365 0.46 N/A4 N/A4 
8% Treasury Stock 2000 2 -0.0193 10 2.3436 -3.65 N/A N/A 
7% Treasury Stock 2002 1 -1.7608 34 1.1138 - N/A N/A 
 
1The number of days during the sample period on which a gilt of the relevant maturity was overpriced or 
underpriced, after allowing for the estimated bid-ask spread.  
2The test statistic is in bold font when the value is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
3Equally weighted averages of the percentage stripped or reconstituted in each year of the sample. 
4Excluded because of small sample size (ten weeks from 29 September 2003 to maturity).  
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Table 6 
Regression analysis of price differential on time to maturity,  
measured by number of strips in strips package 
 
The regression equation is PDgiltj,t  =  α  + βNstripsj,t + ej,t, where PDgiltj,t is the price differential for 
gilt j on day t, and Nstripsj,t is the number of strips in the strips package for gilt j on day t. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Dependent variable Signed price 
differential 
Absolute price 
differential 
 
Intercept 0.031*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.046*** 
(0.002) 
Number of strips in 
strips package 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Adjusted R2 0.007 
 
0.041 
F-stat 478.9 
 
2,798.2 
Observations 65,500 65,500 
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Table 7 
Tests for stale prices of strips packages 
 
The table shows the autocorrelation coefficients for the daily returns on each gilt and its equivalent strips package during the sample period. The 
standard error (SE) is shown next to the autocorrelation. ‘Strips minus gilt’ is the autocorrelation for the strips minus the autocorrelation for the 
gilts, followed by the chi-square statistic to test the significance of the difference in the autocorrelations. The chi-squared statistic is calculated 
using the formula in Ahn et al (2002, p. 671): )1(2)( 2
,
2
gsgsT γρρ −− , where T is the number of days (observations) for the relevant gilt, ρs (ρg) is the 
autocorrelation of the strips (gilt), and 2
,gsγ is the correlation coefficient between the strips and gilt return. The chi-squared statistic has one degree 
of freedom. The regression test report the beta coefficient and the accompanying t-statistic from running equation (4) for each gilt-strips pair. 
*(**)(***) indicates the 10% (5%)(1%) significance level, respectively. The gilts are sorted by redemption date. 
 
 Gilt Strips package Strips 
minus gilt 
Chi-
square stat 
 Regression test 
  Autocorrel’n SE Autocorrel’n SE Beta t-stat 
8% Treasury Stock 2000 -0.004 0.036 -0.001 0.036 0.003 0.009 0.653 16.39 
7% Treasury Stock 2002 0.010 0.030 0.011 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.596 17.96 
6½% Treasury Stock 2003 0.031 0.026 -0.018 0.026 -0.050 4.405 0.440 16.67 
5% Treasury Stock 2004 0.034 0.028 -0.002 0.028 -0.036 1.984 0.407 14.70 
8½% Treasury Stock 2005 0.029 0.022 0.012 0.022 -0.017 0.675 0.346 14.94 
7½% Treasury Stock 2006 0.036* 0.021 0.023 0.021 -0.013 0.489 0.364 17.60 
4½% Treasury Stock 2007 -0.016 0.037 -0.013 0.037 0.003 0.006 0.705 15.78 
7¼% Treasury Stock 2007 0.036* 0.020 0.024 0.020 -0.012 0.460 0.373 19.63 
5% Treasury Stock 2008 0.007 0.027 0.004 0.027 -0.003 0.016 0.528 19.77 
4% Treasury Stock 2009 -0.005 0.026 -0.028 0.026 -0.023 0.936 0.490 19.32 
5¾% Treasury Stock 2009 0.047** 0.019 0.037** 0.019 -0.010 0.501 0.265 17.60 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2010 0.019 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.006 0.051 0.438 17.06 
3¼% Treasury Gilt 2011 0.017 0.037 0.014 0.037 -0.003 0.008 0.264 7.09 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2011 0.003 0.028 0.009 0.028 0.006 0.067 0.347 13.24 
5% Treasury Stock 2012 -0.010 0.020 -0.004 0.020 0.006 0.152 0.288 18.11 
5¼% Treasury Gilt 2012 0.014 0.030 0.033 0.028 0.018 0.566 0.223 9.25 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2013 0.014 0.034 0.023 0.034 0.009 0.138 0.165 6.25 
2¼% Treasury Gilt 2014 -0.059 0.039 0.015 0.039 0.074 9.300*** 0.143 5.90 
5% Treasury Stock 2014 -0.015 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.015 1.035 0.232 15.86 
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Table 7 cont. 
 
 Gilt Strips package Strips 
minus gilt 
Chi-
square stat 
 Regression test 
 Autocorrel’n SE Autocorrel’n SE Beta t-stat 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2015 -0.004 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.021 2.143 0.205 14.00 
8% Treasury Stock 2015 0.048*** 0.017 0.047*** 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.206 17.11 
4% Treasury Gilt 2016 0.010 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.019 1.564 0.147 9.80 
5% Treasury Gilt 2018 0.026 0.030 0.052* 0.030 0.026 2.851 0.104 6.88 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2019 0.029 0.042 0.032 0.042 0.003 0.016 0.102 4.59 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2019 0.052 0.036 0.085** 0.036 0.034 4.569** 0.065 4.11 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2020 0.040 0.054 0.104* 0.054 0.063 6.579*** 0.106 4.34 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2020 0.013 0.025 0.039 0.025 0.025 4.049* 0.129 10.39 
3¾% Treasury Gilt 2021 0.065 0.081 0.129 0.080 0.064 3.34 0.131 3.86 
8% Treasury Stock 2021 0.053*** 0.017 0.052*** 0.017 -0.001 0.005 0.136 14.11 
4% Treasury Gilt 2022 0.012 0.039 0.062 0.039 0.050 8.831*** 0.072 4.35 
5% Treasury Stock 2025 0.023 0.020 0.036* 0.020 0.013 2.239 0.089 10.33 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2027 0.080*** 0.028 0.084*** 0.028 0.003 0.125 0.044 4.80 
6% Treasury Stock 2028 0.078*** 0.017 0.080*** 0.017 0.001 0.025 0.088 11.85 
4¾% Treasury Gilt 2030 0.094*** 0.032 0.087*** 0.032 -0.007 0.577 0.029 3.06 
4¼% Treasury Stock 2032 0.067*** 0.019 0.070*** 0.019 0.002 0.119 0.051 7.65 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2034 0.062 0.043 0.115*** 0.043 0.053 13.482*** 0.066 4.66 
4¼% Treasury Stock 2036 0.034 0.022 0.038* 0.022 0.003 0.16 0.055 7.01 
4¾% Treasury Stock 2038 0.067*** 0.023 0.070*** 0.023 0.003 0.159 0.061 7.46 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2039 0.058 0.041 0.091** 0.041 0.033 6.146*** 0.047 3.58 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2040 0.050 0.065 0.061 0.065 0.011 0.428 0.030 1.82 
4½% Treasury Gilt 2042 0.074** 0.031 0.080*** 0.031 0.006 0.440 0.032 3.79 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2046 0.074*** 0.027 0.081*** 0.027 0.007 0.715 0.035 4.60 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2049 0.084** 0.036 0.085** 0.036 0.001 0.006 0.039 3.49 
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2055 0.073*** 0.026 0.086*** 0.026 0.013 3.208 0.038 5.28 
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Table 8 
Comparison of price differentials between subperiods 
 
The table compares the scale and frequency of price differentials in excess of the bid-ask spread 
between the first third of the sample period and the last third. All the test statistics are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
   Mean Median Number  Percentage  
   
Strips 
over-
priced 
Strips 
under-
priced 
Strips 
over-
priced 
Strips 
under-
priced 
Strips 
over- 
priced 
Strips 
under- 
priced 
Strips 
over- 
priced 
Strips 
under- 
priced 
From 08-Dec-97  0.285 -0.121 0.059 -0.056 2,335 376 18.80% 3.03% 
To 03-Aug-02          
           
From 31-Mar-07  0.225 -0.170 0.110 -0.108 9,341 2,039 28.95% 6.32% 
To 
 
25-Nov-11 
 
   
 
     
Test statistics for differences  t-stat 3.68 
t-stat 
-3.92 
Mann-
Whitney 
stat 
56,041,215 
Mann-
Whitney 
stat 
2,130,849 
  
t-stat 
-21.88 
t-stat 
-12.77 
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Table 9 
Mean price differentials net of bid-ask spread, sorted by coupon  
 
The ‘%’ column shows the percentage of price differentials, of the total number of differentials for gilts in the relevant coupon category, that fall 
within the relevant pricing category. ‘Mean price differential’ is the mean of the sample falling within the relevant coupon and pricing categories. 
 
Conventional Overpriced Conventional Underpriced Difference < t-statistic for Z-statistic for
Bid-Ask Spread difference in difference in
Mean Price Mean Price means of absolute price numbers over
Coupon C Observations % Differential (£) Observations % Differential (£) Observations % differentials and underpriced
C < 5% 2,543 8.5% -0.3100 8,583 28.7% 0.2180 18,791 62.8% 14.351 -65.717
5% ≤ C < 6% 453 3.0% -0.1984 1,133 7.6% 0.3719 13,303 89.3% -7.684 -17.640
6% ≤ C < 7% 239 4.8% -0.3262 1,402 28.4% 0.1925 3,287 66.7% 6.178 -33.154
7% ≤ C < 8% 42 0.7% -0.1654 359 6.1% 0.5436 5,530 93.2% -4.928 -16.284
C > 8% 374 3.8% -0.2190 2,344 23.8% 0.2182 7,117 72.4% 0.044 -42.534
 
